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THE PRIVATISATION OF PILOTAGE SERVICES: A PANACEA FOR SOUTH 
AFRICA’S PILOTAGE ILLS? 
Abstract 
Does the creation of a deemed servant-master relationship, between pilot and ship-
owner or master through section 76 (2) of the National Ports Act (hereafter the 
NPA);1 accurately reflect the de facto relationship in which the parties stand?  
Can the provision’s importation of the doctrine of vicarious liability and consequent 
foisting of liability on the ship-owner be defined as logical, just and practical?  
It will be argued after having had recourse to the manner in which these roles have 
come to be defined and understood in South African labour jurisprudence, the 
governing law, respective positions occupied by ship-owner and port authority, 
broad-based considerations of policy, and key tenets of the rationale underpinning 
the concept of vicarious liability; that the answer to the above-raised questions is a 
resounding no. In addition, the writer will submit that the privatisation of pilotage 
services presents a solution, alternate to the irrational imposition of the doctrine of 
vicarious liability, which is palatable to government, ship-owning interests and pilot. 
a) Introduction 
Typically, claims arising from consequences of pilot error satisfy the definition of a 
‘maritime claim’ contained in s 1 (1) (e)2 and s 1 (1) (l)3 of the Admiralty 
Jurisdiction Regulation Act.4 As a result thereof; a South African court sitting in 
admiralty has jurisdiction to hear such claims.5 As to the identification of the 
appropriate law; s 6 (2) dictates that South African statute, if relevant, trumps pre-
existing English admiralty law and is the law to be applied.  The NPA, chiefly 
through sections 75 and 76, regulates the extent of the pilot’s6 liability for his/her 
acts or omissions whilst a vessel is under compulsory pilotage.7 Thus, the Act is 
applicable to disputes arising from pilot error, before a South African court sitting in 
admiralty.  
It is s 76 (2) of the Act that provides the primary focus for this dissertation. The 
section reads as follows: 
                                                          
1National Ports Act 12 of 2005. 
2The subsection reads: ‘[any claim for, arising out of or relating to] damage caused by or to a ship, 
whether by collision or otherwise’. 
3The subsection reads: ‘[any claim for, arising out of or relating to] towage or pilotage’. 
4Admiralty Jurisdiction Regulation Act 105 of 1983. 
5Section 2 (1). 
6Note, unless the contrary is indicated, use of the term ‘pilot’ refers to a pilot licensed in accordance 
with section 77 of the NPA.  
7Note, in accordance with section 75 (1) of the NPA, all major South African ports are compulsory 
pilotage areas.  
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‘Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, the pilot is deemed to be the 
servant of the owner or master of the vessel under pilotage and such owner or 
master is liable for the acts or omissions of the pilot’.  
Its effect is clear; through placing the pilot and owner or master of the vessel 
under pilotage in a servant-master relationship, the provision imports the doctrine of 
vicarious liability. In doing so, it ensures that the latter is liable for the acts or 
omissions of the former. However, it is the writer’s assertion, that this schema of 
responsibility doesn’t accurately reflect the relationship in which pilot and 
master/owner actually stand. Rather, the provision creates a fiction, borne out of the 
state’s desire to avoid liability for the acts or omissions of its erstwhile employees.   
It is, at this juncture, necessary to map-out the ownership structure of South 
Africa’s commercial ports. Hare is instructive in this regard:  
‘South African commercial ports are owned by the National Ports Authority of 
South Africa (the authority). All the assets, liabilities, rights and obligations that 
Transnet had under the previous dispensation (the Legal Succession Act, 
repealed by the National Ports Act) vest in this corporate entity. However, the 
sole member and shareholder of this entity is Transnet Limited, which in turn is 
wholly owned by the state’.8  
This dissertation commences with a dissection of the actual relationship of 
pilot and master or owner, whilst simultaneously determining whether said 
relationship is akin to that of employer and employee, the foundation upon which the 
traditional interpretation of the doctrine of vicarious liability rests, or conversely; that 
of principal and independent contractor.  
b) Analogous to an independent contractor 
The distinction between an employee and independent contractor has its roots in 
Roman law.9 In terms of which, two specific forms of contract were contemplated. 
First, the locatio conductio operis[a contract of work] which governed the letting and 
hiring of a specific piece of work, akin to the modern-day contract in terms of which 
an independent contractor is appointed to complete a particular body of work.10 
Second, the locatio conductio operarum [a contract of service] which governed the 
letting and hiring of personal services in exchange for remuneration, akin to the 
modern-day contract of employment.11 
                                                          
8JE Hare Shipping Law and Admiralty Jurisdiction in South Africa 2ed (2009) 500.  





It is trite that the distinction and underlying principles set out above were well 
received by the Roman Dutch jurists and have, in turn, formed an integral part of our 
own modern-day labour law.12 Indeed, the term ‘contract of work’ has become 
synonymous with the locator operis or independent contractor, whilst the term 
‘contract of service’ has become synonymous with the locator operarum or 
employee. Yet, labour legislation does not provide conclusive definition of these 
terms and, as such, it has fallen to the courts to develop tests in order to draw the 
distinction.13 
The dominant impression test is widely regarded as the standard means 
employed by our courts in distinguishing between employees and independent 
contractors.14 Essentially, the test poses a question; as held in the case of Medical 
Association of SA & Others v Minister of Health & Another:  
‘The dominant impression test, it seems, entails that one should have regard to 
all those considerations or indicia which would contribute towards an indication 
whether the contract is that of service or a contract of work and react to the 
impression one gets upon consideration of all such indicia’.15 
It is apparent then that the dominant impression test requires the consideration 
of a multitude of factors, dismissing the relatively narrow control test that preceded 
it. However, this is not to say that the presence of the right of supervision and control 
is no longer a decisive factor in determining whether an individual can be said to be 
an employee, this much is evident from the following passage taken from the 
judgment of Joubert JA in Smit v Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner: 
‘[O]ne of the most important legal characteristics of locatio conductio 
operarum in Roman Dutch Law is the duty of the employee irrespective of 
whether he happens to be a domestic servant or any other type of employee, to 
obey the lawful commands, orders or instructions of his employer in regard to 
the performance of his services. It follows that the employer has a concomitant 
right to supervise and control the manner in which the employee is to perform 
his services’.16 
‘The presence of such a right of supervision and control is indeed one of the 
most important indicia that a particular contract is in all probability a contract of 
service [as distinct from a contract of work]. The greater the degree of 
supervision and control to be exercised by the employer over the employee the 
stronger the probability will be that it is a contract of service. On the other hand, 
the greater the degree of independence from such supervision and control the 
                                                          
12Smit v Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner 1979 (1) SA 51 (A) at 58 G-H. 
13Basson Labour Law 26.  
14Ibid 27.  
15[1997] 5 BLLR 562 (LC) at 569F-G. 
16Smit v Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner at 60 G. 
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stronger the probability will be that it is a contract of work [as distinct from a 
contract of service]’.17 
What is meant by the employer’s right of supervision and control in this 
context? In Colonial Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd v Macdonald18the learned 
judge held: 
‘[O]ne thing appears to me beyond dispute and that is that the relation of master 
and servant cannot exist where there is a total absence of the right of 
supervising and controlling the workman under the contract; in other words, 
unless the master not only has the right to prescribe to the workplace what work 
has to be done, but also the manner in which such work has to be done’.19 
Supervision can be defined as: ‘the right of the employer to inspect and direct 
the work being done by the employee’.20 Control signifies a wider concept, 
expressed by Joubert JA in the following terms: 
‘It includes inter alia the right of an employer to decide what work is to be done 
by the employee, the manner in which it has to be done by him, the means to be 
employed by him in doing it , the time when and place where it is to be done by 
him’.21 
Can it be said that the owner or master of the vessel has the right of supervision 
and control over the pilot? Since the parties’ relationship is governed by statute, it 
stands to reason that it is necessary to have recourse to the relevant legislation, the 
NPA, in order to provide a suitably informed answer.  
Section 75 of the Act is instructive in determining the dynamic of the 
relationship in which pilot and owner or master stand. The provision’s salient effect 
is as follows; it is the pilot’s function to navigate a vessel into port, to direct its 
movements and to determine and control the movements of the tugs assisting the 
vessel under pilotage.22 It falls to the pilot to determine the number of tugs required 
for pilotage with the concurrence of the master of the vessel.23 However, in the event 
of a dispute between pilot and master of the vessel with regard to the amount of tugs 
required, the harbour master (an employee of the authority), not the master of the 
vessel, has the final say.24In addition, s 75 (6) is of critical importance, it dictates 
that: 
                                                          
17Ibid at 62 D-G. 
181931 AD 412.  
19Ibid at 434-435. 
20Smit v Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner at 60 H- 61 A. 
21Ibid. 
22Section 75 (3). 
23Section 75 (4). 
24Section 75 (5). 
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‘The master of the vessel must at all times remain in command of the vessel and 
neither the master nor any person under the master’s command may, while the 
vessel is under pilotage, in any way interfere with the navigation or movement 
of the vessel or prevent the pilot from carrying out his or her duties, except in an 
emergency [my emphasis], where the master may intervene to preserve the 
safety of the vessel, cargo or crew and take whatever action he or she considers 
reasonably necessary to avert the danger’. 
It is clear, upon analysis of the above, that the pilot is not subordinate to the 
master of the vessel in several respects. It is conceivable that the pilot may proceed 
in terms of s 75 (4) without the master’s approval, as a result of s 75 (5).  Whilst s 75 
(6) may, on the face of it, appear to guarantee the right of supervision and control to 
the master, it does no such thing. The provision is something of an anomaly; it runs 
contrary to logic to state that whilst under pilotage, the command of the vessel vests 
in the master and to simultaneously hamper the master in the exercise of his/her 
command by restricting it to situations of emergency. Yet, this is precisely what s 75 
(6) does. Whilst the vessel is under pilotage, the master may only interfere with the 
navigation or movement of the vessel, ‘in an emergency where necessary to preserve 
the safety of vessel, cargo, or crew [my emphasis]’. Section 75 (6) does not provide 
the master with the de facto authority that it initially and outwardly claims to. 
Additionally, the provision is not in keeping with the fundamental import of the Act 
evidenced by s 76 (2), that the pilot is deemed to be the servant of the owner or 
master. This view finds support in the work of Hare:  
‘The provisions leaving the master in “overall command” run counter to the 
statutory injunction not to “interfere” with the pilot’s navigation, virtually 
emasculating that command [my emphasis]’.25 
Notwithstanding inconsistencies within the Act itself; s 75 (6) poses a very real 
practical problem. Through limiting the master’s right of supervision and control 
over the pilot to instances of emergency, the provision casts a duty, negative in its 
construct, upon the master; not to interfere with the pilot’s command unless there is 
an emergency. However, in so doing, the master incurs an obligation that is two-fold 
in its construction; to use his/her discretion to identify whether the circumstances are 
such so as to constitute an emergency and to take action, which he/she deems 
reasonable, to avert the danger in question. This, it is submitted, places the master in 
an unenviable and somewhat counter-intuitive position. This is so due to the 
following factors:  First, it is settled law, as per the Supreme Court of Appeal in The 
                                                          
25Hare Shipping Law 489. 
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Stella Tingas,26 that the master is entitled to assume that the pilot in question is a 
competent one.27 Second, the primary quality that a pilot is expected to possess, and 
is indeed employed for, is a superior knowledge of the local conditions and obstacles 
posed in the course of entry into the port in question.28 Third, the very real and well-
documented danger posed by divided command.29  
To expect the master to overrule the pilot, an individual specifically employed 
for his/her superior knowledge of the prevailing conditions, pursuant to his/her s 75 
(6) discretion is to simultaneously place an overwhelming burden upon the master 
and a failure to take cognisance of the unique role that the pilot is employed to 
perform. The master and, by extension, the owner is forced into a statutorily imposed 
game of ‘stick or twist’. And in either instance, should damage result, it is with the 
ship-owning interests that liability rests. Hare succinctly illustrates the provisions’ 
effect and the master’s resultant dilemma in the following terms: 
‘Confronted with the decision as to whether circumstances are such as to permit 
him/her to interfere with the pilot’s conduct of the vessel, the master’s concern 
not to contravene the statutory prohibition on intervention unless there is an 
emergency might cause him to refrain from countermanding the pilot’s orders 
until it is too late to avert damage. If the master fails to interfere in an 
emergency, timeously or at all, he/she may be found to have been at fault for 
such failure. If the master intervenes to interfere with the pilot’s control of 
navigation prematurely, he/she may be in contravention of the statutory 
injunction not to interfere with the pilot’s control of the navigation of the vessel. 
The master’s dilemma may be compounded by the fact that in an emergency the 
period within which the master could take action to avert the danger may simply 
be too short for any effective evasive action to be taken’.30  
As to the dynamic of the de facto relationship in which pilot and master stand 
and the dangers of divided command, the view of Alverstone CJ in The Tactician, 
subsequently endorsed by Scott JA in The Stella Tingas is instructive: 
‘The cardinal principle to be borne in mind in these pilotage cases, that raise 
difficult questions of law, and very often difficult questions of fact, is that the 
pilot is in sole charge of the ship, and that all directions as to speed, course, 
stopping and reversing, and everything of that kind, are for the pilot’.31 
‘[A]s to the danger of interference with the conduct of the pilot; and that if 
anything of that kind amounts to an interference or a divided command, serious 
risk is run of the ship losing the benefit of compulsory pilotage’.32 
                                                          
26Transnet Limited t/a Portnet v The Owners of The MV ‘Stella Tingas’ 2003 (2) SA 473 (SCA).  
27Ibid para 32. 
28Hare Shipping Law 477. 
29See in this regard: The Tactician [1907] P 244 (CA) at 250. 
30Hare Shipping Law 490. 




This view is endorsed and elaborated upon by Rajadurai in his critically 
acclaimed work on compulsory pilotage services rendered in the Australian state of 
Victoria.33 The maritime lawyer and master mariner provides an illustrative account 
of the realities that govern the interaction between pilot and master:  
‘When a pilot boards a vessel, the [m]aster has to assume that the pilot is in all 
respects competent to do the task intended. Technically, ships masters must 
accept the pilot assigned to their ship and in most, if not all cases, the 
[m]aster/[s]hip-owner has no choice with regard to the particular pilot assigned 
to the vessel. The owner is rarely if ever, in a position to evaluate independently 
the relative competence or fitness of the pilot and in any case operational 
considerations make it impractical for the competence of the pilot to be checked 
before the “conduct” of the vessel is handed over’. 34 
It cannot be gainsaid that the master or owner lacks the requisite authority to 
prescribe to the pilot specific tasks to be completed, nor can he/she stipulate the 
manner in which the pilot is to act. It suffices to say that the extent to which the pilot 
is subject to the supervision and control of the owner or master differs substantially 
to that which has been envisioned by the courts as a hallmark of a relationship of 
employment. In accordance with the provisions of the Act, the pilot is able to act 
independently of the master. Employing the rationale of the court in Smit, such a 
finding militates towards a conclusion that the pilot is not an employee of the master 
or owner, but rather an independent contractor.  
However, as has been made clear, in order to satisfy the dominant impression 
test; other considerations must be taken into account. As a result, it is necessary to 
look beyond the concept of supervision and control.  
In addition to the right of supervision and control, the labour appeal court in 
SABC v McKenzie,35 identified several features which mark the distinction between a 
contract of service and contract of work: 
‘The object of the contract of service is the rendering of personal services by the 
employee to the employer. The services are the object of the contract. The 
object of the contract of work is the performance of a certain specified work or 
the production of a certain specified result’.36 
‘Services to be rendered [by an employee] in terms of a contract of service are 
at the disposal of the employer who may in his own discretion subject, of 
course, to questions of repudiation decide whether or not he wants them 
rendered. The independent contractor is bound [my emphasis] to perform 
                                                          
33A Rajadurai ‘Vicarious Liability for Negligent Pilotage in Victoria’ (2002) 16 Austl & NZ Mar L.J 
39. 
34Ibid at 41 – 42.  
35[1991] 1 BLLR 1 (LAC). 
36Ibid at 5-6. 
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certain specified work or produce a certain specified result within a time fixed 
by the contract or within a reasonable time where no time has been specified’.37 
‘A contract of service terminates on the expiration of the period of service 
entered into while a contract of work terminates on the completion of a 
specified work or on production of a specified result’.38 
It is the production of a specified result, typically the safe navigation of the 
vessel in or out of port; that provides the object of the agreement between the owner 
or master and the pilot. The services rendered by the pilot are not at the disposal of 
the owner or master; he/she cannot decide whether or not he/she wants them 
rendered. To the contrary, they are foisted upon him/her in terms of the Act.39The 
pilot, on the other hand, is bound to perform certain specified work or produce a 
certain specified result. Any agreement which can be said to exist between owner 
and the pilot terminates upon the production of that result. These are characteristics 
common to both the independent contractor’s contract of work and the relationship in 
which owner or master and pilot stand.  
In addition, the following factors are relevant to the distinction between 
independent contractor and employee and, it is submitted, should be taken into 
account in analysing the relationship of pilot and master or owner:40  
The pilot does not render his/her services exclusively to the owner or master, 
typically, in accordance with a contract of employment; one would be precluded 
from working for another.41 The owner/master does not have the right to discipline 
the pilot, a further indication of the absence of supervision and control.42 
These factors reveal the true dynamic of the relationship in which the parties 
stand. Crucially, after taking cognisance of these factors, the dominant impression 
that one is left with is that the pilot is not an employee of the owner or master. To the 
contrary, the dominant impression is that the pilot and owner/master stand in a 
relationship akin to that of independent contractor and principal. In sum, the 
relationship in which pilot and owner or master stand is analogous to that of 
independent contractor and principal, not employee and employer, or as the Act 
declares, servant and master.  
                                                          
37Ibid. 
38Ibid. 
39See in this regard; section 75 (2). 





A rebuttable presumption was added to the Labour Relations Act43 in 2002.44 
In accordance with s 200A, a number of factors are listed and if one or more of those 
factors is present a rebuttable presumption of employment is triggered. Basson is of 
the view that the presumption amounts to a restatement of the labour law principles 
previously espoused by the courts.45 Section 200A reads as follows:  
‘Until the contrary is proved, a person who works for, or renders services to, 
any other person is presumed, regardless of the form of the contract, to be an 
employee, if any one or more of the following factors are present:46 
‘[T]he manner in which the person works is subject to the control or direction of 
another person’.47 
‘[T]he person’s hours of work are subject to the control or direction of another 
person’.48 
‘[I]n the case of a person who works for an organisation, the person forms part 
of that organisation’.49 
‘[T]he person has worked for that other person for an average of at least 40 
hours per month over the last three months’.50 
‘[T]he person is economically dependent on the other person for whom he or 
she works or renders services’.51 
‘[T]he person is provided with tools of trade or work equipment by the other 
person’.52 
‘[T]he person only works for or renders services to one person’.53 
When viewed in the context of his/her relationship with the ship-owner or 
master, the pilot fails to satisfy any of the factors that have been listed above.  
c) A relationship akin to employment, the foundation of the doctrine of vicarious 
liability 
It is settled law, in South Africa, that liability may only arise vicariously if a 
relationship akin to that of employment is present. Therefore, as a logical 
consequence, the doctrine of vicarious liability does not apply at common law to the 
relationship of principal and independent contractor. This much is made clear by 
Nugent JA in the case of Chartaprops v Silberman:54 
                                                          
43Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. 
44Basson Labour Law 31. 
45 Ibid. 
46Section 200A (1). 
47Section 200A (1) (a). 
48Section 200A (1) (b). 
49Section 200A (1) (c). 
50Section 200A (1) (d). 
51Section 200A (1) (e). 
52Section 200A (1) (f). 
53Section 200A (1) (g). 
542009 (1) 265 (SCA). 
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‘Where liability arises vicariously it is because the defendant and wrongdoer 
stand in a particular relationship to one another. It is also well established that 
the relationships to which the rule applies do not include the [principal’s] 
relationship with an independent contractor’.55 
This is not to say that a principal may never be held liable for the acts or 
omissions of an independent contractor. However, if such liability is to arise, it does 
not do so vicariously. Rather, it follows as a consequence of the principal’s own 
negligence, in keeping with the application of the general tenets of delictual 
liability.56  
It is apparent then that s 76 (2) constitutes a radical departure from the position 
at South African common law, through holding the master or owner vicariously 
liable for the acts or omissions of the pilot, notwithstanding the absence of a 
relationship akin to employment. 
d) Additional criticism 
Section 74 (1) (d) of the NPA is an unambiguous provision; it casts a clear and non-
delegable duty on the port authority. The content of which is as follows:  
‘[The authority must, for the purpose of ensuring safety of navigation and 
shipping in ports] provide or procure pilotage services and regulate the safe 
provision of pilotage services by licensed pilots [my emphasis]’.  
Section 77 (1) of the Act identifies the bodies responsible for the certification and 
licensing of pilots:  
‘No person may perform the functions of a pilot in a port without having been 
duly certified by the South African Maritime Safety Authority and licensed by 
the Authority to do so’.  
It is apparent, upon analysis of the above-cited provisions, that the port 
authority is vested with the responsibility of determining the level of expertise 
required from pilots to gain entry into the profession. In addition, it is the port 
authority that is tasked with ensuring, on a regular basis, that pilots deliver their 
services in such a manner so as to be deemed safe. As a result thereof, it is submitted 
that, due to the level of control that it is able to exercise with regard to both the 
standards expected and expertise required of pilots, the authority and not the ship-
owner is best placed to act against the occurrence of negligence on the part of pilots 
and the consequent damages thereof.  If one is to accept this maxim then it must 
surely follow that it is counter-intuitive to place liability for negligent pilotage with 
                                                          
55Ibid para 6.  
56Ibid para 12. 
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the ship owner. This is so, in addition to the points of law previously raised, due to a 
number of broader policy-based concerns.  
Rajadurai identifies the deterrence theory as one of the key tenets that provides 
justification for the imposition of vicarious liability on employers.57 The deterrence 
theory states that the ability or capacity to manage risk should attract an equal level 
of accountability.58 Proponents of the theory contend that liability should rest with 
the individual or body most able to guard against harm occurring. A consequence of 
allocating liability in such a manner puts pressure on the employer to implement best 
practice principles in guarding against the occurrence of harm due to the knowledge 
that if harm should result, as a consequence of the negligence of one of its 
employees, the employer will incur economic sanction. By way of summation, it is 
logical to hold those with the capacity to prevent damages from occurring 
accountable when damage does in fact occur. It is the presence of the knowledge that 
liability will rest with the employer that provides the necessary impetus for the 
employer to take steps, at its own expense, to actively guard against the occurrence 
of harm.  
The imposition of vicarious liability on ship-owners is incompatible with the 
constraints of the deterrence theory. In addition, through absolving the port authority 
of liability for damage occurring as a result of negligent pilotage, s 76 (1) of the NPA 
has removed a key source of impetus for the authority to comply with its non-
delegable s 74 (1) (d) duty to ensure that pilotage services are conducted in a safe 
manner.  It is conceded that in instances where the authority has flagrantly failed to 
comply with its duty to safely regulate the provision of pilotage services; there may 
remain scope for the institution of an action against the authority. The following 
passage by Hare is instructive in this regard:  
‘[T]he statutory exclusion of liability should be limited to those instances in 
which the pilot’s good faith acts or omissions in performing his or her functions 
are the sole proximate cause of the resulting damage. If the Authority itself is 
negligent or if its employee, other than the pilot, causes or contributes to the 
damage suffered, the exclusion from liability should not apply’.59  
However, that the Act has not firmly shut the door on litigants who would 
look to recover damages from the authority for an obvious breach of its duty does 
                                                          
57Rajadurai 2002 Austl & NZ Mar L.J 61.  
58Ibid. 
59Hare Shipping Law 493.  
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not, it is submitted, sufficiently counteract the diminished responsibility that occurs 
as a result of shifting liability from the authority, the body charged with the 
regulation of the safe provision of pilotage services, to the ship-owner.  
There are sound economic reasons for imposing vicarious liability on 
employers. It is trite that, as a general rule, an employer is far better placed than an 
employee to satisfy a claim for damages. The employer, due to the comparatively 
larger resources at its disposal, can be said to be a far better risk absorber than the 
employee.60 Thus, the claims of innocent third parties may not be defeated by the 
financial impotence of an employee; they may, by law, look to the employer for 
redress.  However, it is not easy to marry this key component of the underlying 
rationale behind the doctrine of vicarious liability with s 76 (2).   
It is incredibly difficult to accept that the ship-owner is better placed to satisfy 
the claims of third-parties, for damages suffered as a result of incidences of pilotage, 
than the authority.   
In addition, it would be nonsensical to suggest that ship-owners provide a more 
practical source from which to seek satisfaction of claims than the authority. In fact, 
as posited by Rajadurai,61 the converse is true. Through limiting third-parties’ rights 
of recourse to the ship-owner, through s 76 (2), the ability of third-party victims to 
acquire sufficient compensation is severely limited. This is borne out by the 
application of the relevant provisions of the NPA to a scenario of collision; as took 
place in the case of The Stella Tingas:  
A vessel (hereafter referred to as ship A), navigated by a pilot supplied by the 
port authority in accordance with s 75 (1), enters Durban harbour in order to take on 
bunkers. In the course of doing so it collides with another vessel (hereafter referred 
to as ship B), moored at its berth for the purpose of loading cargo, due to the 
negligence of the pilot. Both vessels are damaged in the collision. 
Provided it is unable to prove that the pilot acted in bad faith, a concept that 
will be discussed in due course, s 76 (1) precludes the owner of ship B (hereafter 
referred to as owner B) from looking to the port authority for compensation. By 
                                                          
60M Loubser et al The Law of Delict in South Africa 1 ed (2009) 368.  
61Rajadurai 2002 Austl & NZ Mar L.J 61.  
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virtue of s 76 (2), owner B must seek redress through claiming its damages from the 
owner of ship A (hereafter owner A).  
The above-mentioned schema of liability may, notwithstanding its counter-
intuitive nature, not pose owner B any fatal problems and allow it to recover 
adequate compensation. On the facts of The Stella Tingas, where the collision was 
described as merely ‘a glancing blow’ and relatively minor, it is likely that a litigant 
proceeding in terms of s 76(2) would be able to obtain redress through the arrest of 
ship A and a subsequent action in rem.  
However, one does not have to tweak the facts of The Stella Tingas a great deal 
in order to envisage an altogether different result.   
It is neither unconceivable nor uncommon that a ship-owner making use of a 
South African port may have only one asset within South Africa’s territorial limits ; a 
single vessel in respect of which pilotage services have been employed. As a result, 
owner B would have only one asset against which judgment could be executed.   
It is also conceivable that a collision could be far more serious than that which 
took place in The Stella Tingas, not a mere glancing blow. It follows that ship A and 
its cargo could have been sunk in the collision. In such an instance owner B’s right to 
claim compensation from owner A would be rendered nugatory; there would be 
nothing for it to arrest or attach.  
Let us posit an alternate scenario, neither vessel sinks but, due to the severity of 
the collision, the damages suffered by both vessels are significant. Prior to the 
collision, the value of ship B exceeded that of ship A and, in addition, the 
consequences of the accident were such that the value of owner B’s claim now 
exceeds the value of the damaged ship A. Owner B may arrest ship A and institute an 
action in rem but, since the value of the claim exceeds the value of the res, it is in a 
position of significant risk. Owner A may simply decline to defend the action. In 
such an instance, execution would be limited to the proceeds of the sale of the 
damaged res.62 Owner B would not receive adequate compensation. Proceeding in 
personam would not materially alter owner B’s prospects. It may attach ship A in 
order to found jurisdiction and proceed in personam against owner A. However, 
owner B continues to occupy a position of risk. Owner A may leave the claim 
                                                          
62Hare Shipping Law 92.  
14 
 
undefended, decline to put up security and, in the absence of any alternate assets 
within the court’s jurisdiction, owner B’s compensation would, for the immediate 
future and perhaps permanently, be reduced to the value of the damaged vessel.  
In addition, the plight of owner B is further complicated by the clandestine 
nature of vessel ownership. In certain instances, it may well be put to the proof of 
attesting ownership of the offending vessel, by no means a straight-forward task. 
This much is expressed by the writer and investigative journalist Rose George: 
‘Most ship owners operate decent ships that are safe, and pay their crews 
properly. But if you are unscrupulous, there is no better place to hide than 
behind a flag. The ITF [International Transport Workers Federation] calls flags 
of convenience a “corporate veil”. The Economist, a supporter of free markets, 
and so surely a supporter of this freest market of all, calls them “cat’s cradles of 
ownership structures”. I call them a back door, easy to slip through if 
necessary’.63 
George’s concerns are exacerbated when applied to the South African context. 
Not a single merchant vessel is listed on South Africa’s shipping register.64 All 
commercial vessels making use of South Africa’s ports are flagged to the registers of 
foreign states.  
To place an innocent third-party victim such as owner B in this onerous and 
tenuous position, as s 76 undoubtedly does, is wholly inequitable. The following 
passage, taken from the judgment of Deane J in the Australian case of Oceanic Crest 
Shipping Co. v Pilbara Harbour Services Pty Ltd.65 is of some persuasive value:  
‘It would be quite contrary to justice if such an injured party were unable to 
obtain redress from the trading corporation whose employed pilot had caused 
the injury by his negligence in the course of his ordinary duties performed for 
reward to the trading corporation merely by reason of the facts that pilotage in 
the port was compulsory..... If that were so, such an injured party would.... be 
left to seek redress either from a ship which, if it was not on the bottom of the 
port, may well have long since departed the country or from a shipping owner 
who may well be in some foreign land whose laws are framed to afford 
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64South African Press Association ‘Only Foreign Ships Transport SA’s Exports’, 01 October 2013, 
available at http://mg.co.za/article/2013-10-01-only-foreigners-transport-sas-export , accessed on 24 
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e) Section 76 (1) and the concept of good faith; a road to nowhere 
The extent of the authority’s and pilot’s exemption from liability, contained in s 76 
(1), is for all acts or omissions done or omitted by the pilot in good faith; whilst 
performing his/her functions in terms of the Act.  
This signifies a marked distinction from the corresponding provision in the 
Act’s predecessor67 (hereafter referred to as the Legal Succession Act) which held 
both pilot and authority blameless for negligent acts or omissions on the part of the 
pilot.  
In the absence of a statutory definition of the term ‘good faith’, Hare’s 
contestation is instructive:  
‘The words must therefore be given their ordinary meaning, which, in this context, is that 
the pilot, in carrying out his or her functions as a pilot, must have acted in the honest 
belief that the course of action he or she followed was correct and appropriate in the 
circumstances’.68 
 
Whereas once a claimant would have to establish gross negligence on the part 
of the pilot in order to defeat the exemption contained in the Legal Succession Act 
it must now, in accordance with 76 (1), establish bad faith on the part of the pilot in 
question; on a balance of probabilities. Hare states that this would necessitate an 
inquiry both subjective and objective in its construct:  
‘Although the determination of whether an individual has acted in good faith 
posits an essentially subjective inquiry, the person’s state of mind must be 
ascertained not only by their evidence but also by reference to the circumstances 
giving rise to the loss or damage. Understood in this way, the pilot might be 
considered to have acted in good faith even though negligent and, in fact, 
grossly negligent. Conversely, bad faith would cover instances in which the 
pilot had intentionally inflicted the damage, and it is submitted, where the pilot 
had acted recklessly, in the narrow sense of having acted with dolus 
eventualis’.69 
 
It is apparent then that Hare has effectively fused the concepts of bad faith and 
intention, in the context of s76 (1). If one were to accept this maxim, it is similarly 
clear that in order to defeat the exemption contained in s 76 (1) and in so doing hold 
the authority liable for damages resulting from the services provided by its pilots, 
one would have to prove intention to cause harm on the part of the specific pilot in 
question.  
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For purposes of this analysis it will be presumed that pilots servicing the ports 
of South Africa do not intentionally set out to cause damage to port users or 
infrastructure, thus rendering discussion of direct intention or dolus directus 
superfluous.  
It will also be presumed that pilots do not harbour alternate unlawful 
ambitions, the realisation of which requires the infliction of damages on port users or 
infrastructure, thus rendering discussion of indirect intention or dolus indirectus 
superfluous. 
It is Hare’s conflation of the broadest form of intention - dolus eventualis- with 
bad faith that is of some interest. A person is said to have acted with dolus eventualis 
if:  
‘[T]he commission of the unlawful act or the causing of the unlawful result is not his main 
aim but he subjectively [foresaw] the possibility that, in striving towards his main aim, the 
unlawful act may be committed or the unlawful result may be caused and he reconciles 
himself to this possibility’. 70 
In seeking to establish the necessary dolus a claimant incurs an onus two-fold 
in its construct.71 First, he/she must establish that the individual in question 
subjectively foresaw that his/her actions might cause harm. 72Second, that the 
individual reconciled himself / herself with the realisation that harm might occur and 
nevertheless persisted with his/her actions or failure to act.73   
The distinction between the concepts of dolus eventualis or recklessness and 
gross negligence is subtle; this much is illustrated by the following passage taken 
from the judgment of Scott JA in the case of The Stella Tingas: 
‘If a person foresees the risk of harm but acts, or fails to act, in the unreasonable 
belief that he or she will be able to avoid the danger or that for some other 
reason it will not eventuate, the conduct in question may amount to ordinary 
negligence or it may amount to gross negligence. If, of course, the risk of harm 
is foreseen and the person in question acts recklessly or indifferently as to 
whether it ensues or not, the conduct will amount to recklessness in the narrow 
sense, in other words, dolus eventualis; but it would then exceed the modern-
day understanding of gross negligence’. 74 
 
It is trite that the onus incurred by a claimant seeking to establish recklessness 
or dolus eventualis is significantly stricter than that which is incurred by its 
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73Ibid. 
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counterpart seeking to establish ordinary or indeed gross negligence. This is 
undoubtedly so as the former must prove the existence of subjective knowledge, on 
the part of the tortfeasor, that harm might occur whereas the latter does not. The 
subjective knowledge of the tortfeasor is irrelevant, in establishing negligence, as the 
primary yardstick employed is an objective one; the standard set by the reasonable 
man or diligens paterfamilias.75 In establishing gross negligence it is the deviation 
from that objective standard that is of relevance; the act or omission must deviate to 
such an extent so as to be considered gross.76  
Through the promulgation of the NPA, government has significantly increased 
the level of protection available to the authority; when met with claims for damages 
resulting from incidences of pilotage. It is however unnecessary to discuss the 
manner in which a claimant might establish bad faith on the part of a specific pilot 
and, in so doing, defeat the exemption contained in s 76 (1).  
This is due to s 76 (2) which is set-out below:   
‘Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act (my emphasis), the pilot is 
deemed to be the servant of the owner or master of the vessel under pilotage and 
such owner or master is liable for the acts or omissions of the pilot’. 
The language of the above-cited provision is abundantly clear. Regardless of a 
claimant’s hypothetical ability to surmount the steep hurdle of establishing bad faith 
on the part of the pilot, the pilot continues to be an employee of the ship-owner and, 
as a result thereof, the ship-owner’s liability for the acts or omissions of the pilot 
persists.  It logically follows that s 76 (1) and the requirement of good faith contained 
therein is wholly unnecessary; a road to nowhere.  
f)   The rationale behind the National Ports Act 
In analysing the rationale behind the NPA, and particularly section 76, it is first 
necessary to discuss English admiralty law relating to the subject of compulsory 
pilotage as distinct from voluntary pilotage. This is so as the drafters of the NPA’s 
predecessor (the Legal Succession Act) elected to follow the English position at 
common law and, in so doing, eschewed the disruption of that common law by 
British parliament. Therefore, as will be considered in due course, the promulgation 
of the NPA signalled a clear break-away from English common law (pertinent for so 
                                                          
75See in this regard: Kruger v Coetzee 2000 (1) SA 827 (SCA).  
76The Stella Tingas para 7.  
18 
 
long in South Africa) aligning South African law with English legislative 
development and, as a result, a rejection of the defence of compulsory pilotage.  
The enactment of the Pilotage Act of 1808 saw the introduction of compulsory 
pilotage, in designated areas, in the United Kingdom.77 Rajadurai expresses the 
impact of this development in the following terms:  
‘The introduction of legislation imposing compulsory pilotage raised doctrinally 
complex questions regarding the liability of the ship-owner in situations where 
damage by and/or to the vessel was caused solely through the negligence of the 
pilot. Whereas the ship owner’s liability for the negligence of pilots engaged 
voluntarily was accepted, ship-owners sought exemption from liability when 
pilotage was compulsory, under the so called “compulsory pilotage defence”’. 78 
The defence of compulsory pilotage was underpinned by a distinction between 
pilotage services provided voluntarily and those that were not.79 Proponents of the 
theory behind the defence contended that a master-servant relationship could only be 
formed voluntarily. Therefore, in instances where a ship-owner was compelled to 
take on and utilise the services of a pilot; a master-servant relationship could not be 
said to exist. This distinction acted as a shield at common law; preventing ship-
owners from incurring liability for the acts or omissions of the compulsory pilot. The 
position is neatly encapsulated by Dr Lushington in the case of The Maria:80  
‘If the taking [of] a pilot on board was compulsory, and the collision was 
occasioned by the fault of that pilot, I shall hold the owners of the “Maria” 
exempt from responsibility; upon general principle, without reference to acts of 
Parliament, for in that case the pilot was not their servant, and the maxim qui 
facit per alium facit per se does not apply. If, on the contrary, the taking [of] a 
pilot was voluntary, then he was the servant of the owners, and the owners are 
responsible’.81 
The common law defence of compulsory pilotage was reinforced and afforded 
statutory recognition through the enactment of various pieces of 19th century 
legislation, culminating in the Merchant Shipping Act.82 Section 633 of which reads 
as follows:  
‘An owner or master of a ship shall not be answerable to any person whatever 
for any loss or damage occasioned by the fault or incapacity of any qualified 
pilot acting in charge of that ship within any district where the employment of a 
qualified pilot is compulsory by law’. 
                                                          
77‘The History of the Corporation of Trinity House of Deptford Strond: 500 years young’, available at 
http://www.trinityhouse.co.uk/th/about/detailed_history , accessed on 02 November 2014. 
78Rajadurai 2002 Austl & NZ Mar L.J 45. 
79Ibid at 46. 
80(1839) 166 E.R. 508. 
81Ibid at 513. 
82Merchant Shipping Act 1894 (United Kingdom). 
19 
 
The statutory protection enjoyed by ship-owners was however relatively short-
lived. The distinction at law between compulsory and voluntarily pilotage was 
eroded by Section 15 (1) of the Pilotage Act of 191383: 
‘Notwithstanding anything in any public or local Act, the owner or master of a 
vessel navigating under circumstances in which pilotage is compulsory shall be 
answerable for any loss or damage caused by the vessel or by any fault in the 
navigation of the vessel in the same manner as he would if pilotage were not 
compulsory’.  
The impact of the above-cited provision is identified by Scott JA in the case of 
The Stella Tingas:  
‘The effect of the section is to render the ship-owner liable for loss or damage 
caused by the fault of the compulsory pilot in the same way as the ship-owner 
would be liable at common law for loss or damage caused by a voluntary pilot. 
For the purpose of the present case it is important to emphasise that the basis of 
such liability is that a voluntary pilot (and now by statute a compulsory pilot) is 
regarded as the servant of the ship-owner’.84  
Whilst the defence of compulsory pilotage was categorically expunged, from 
the British legal landscape, by the 1913 Pilotage Act; the defence remained available 
to the South African litigant until the commencement of the NPA. That is to say that 
the distinction between voluntary and compulsory pilotage and the consequences that 
flowed from that distinction remained good in South African law right up until the 
year 2006.  
It is submitted that the legal distinction between pilotage services provided on a 
voluntary basis and those that are provided by compulsion of law, as embodied in the 
defence of compulsory pilotage, was a sound one. This is so after having recourse 
not only to the traditional notion of vicarious liability, the original justification of the 
defence as expressed in The Maria; but also to the modern day concept of vicarious 
liability. The latter, as meticulously explored by Morgan,85 is considerably broad. 
Whilst broad enough to include within its ambit volunteers and various non-
contractual employees,86 the modern day concept of vicarious liability, it is 
submitted, presupposes a voluntary association or linkage between the individual or 
entity held liable (A) and the tortfeasor (B). That a voluntary linkage is a 
prerequisite, in accordance with both the traditional and modern notions of vicarious 
liability, is a logical consequence of the importance afforded to the concept of 
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control. As contended by Morgan, control by A over B in itself may be sufficient to 
found vicarious liability.87 However, the converse is similarly true. That is to say in 
the absence of control on the part of A over B, vicarious liability may not be 
founded. This much is expressly admitted by Morgan:  
‘[A]n employer who pays you, and with whom you have a contract of 
employment ceases to be vicariously liable for you if they cease to have control 
over you’. 88  
The absence of control over the day to day activities of the compulsory pilot, 
rendering services in accordance with the NPA, on the part of the master or owner 
has already been discussed at length. 89 Notwithstanding an absence of control in this 
immediate sense, it is the writer’s broader submission that the master or owner 
cannot truly exert control over the pilot, in the manner that the doctrine of vicarious 
liability requires, without a voluntary association between the two. If one is to accept 
this maxim as correct, it logically follows that the master or owner is unable to 
exercise control over the pilot as it is trite that the linkage between the individuals or 
entities is not voluntary. The individual pilot(s) in question is / are selected by the 
port authority in accordance with its mandate contained in s 74 (d) of the NPA. The 
master or owner is then typically compelled (should the s 75 (2) exemption not 
apply), as a result of s 75 (1) of the NPA, to take the pilot on board and to place the 
vessel in his/her hands.  
The consequences of this framework talk further to an absence of control. The 
legal basis upon which the master or owner is able to object to the appointment of a 
particular pilot is unclear. If however, for argument’s sake, it was accepted that such 
a legal basis exists; further difficulties remain. The master or owner is removed from 
the pilots’ certification and training process, is likely to be ignorant as to the 
competency of the pilot in question and therefore lacks the necessary factual basis to 
make any objection. This dynamic is compounded by the nature of the business of 
shipping, the owner, and by extension the master, is typically under a strict deadline 
in a foreign jurisdiction and, as a result, lacks the time or means to satisfy itself as to 
the competency of the individual pilot in question.  
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The above is strikingly different to the typical schema of vicarious liability; 
where A engages voluntarily with B (whether by way of contract or other means), 
since the basis of association between the two is voluntary, A is afforded the 
opportunity to assess the viability of the transaction in question before engaging with 
B. If A is not satisfied as to the competency or suitability of B he/she/it may 
withdraw from the proposed arrangement. If A is satisfied and thereafter engages 
with B or indeed fails to embark on the necessary enquiry and nonetheless engages 
with B; A may well be liable for the acts or omissions of B. In this sense the risk of 
liability is a consequence of the decision. The critical point is one of opportunity on 
the part of the master or owner, an opportunity present in the context of voluntary 
pilotage and absent in its compulsory counterpart.  
In order to provide a complete analysis of the manner in which the NPA deals 
with the issue of pilot liability, it is necessary to explore the provisions’ underlying 
motive. That is to ask, why those responsible for the drafting of the legislation have 
found it necessary to alter the previous dispensation. Perhaps, a more revealing 
question, posed under the auspices of the broader question of ‘why?’ is similar to that 
of the ‘but-for’ enquiry, commonly used to establish factual causation, a necessity in 
establishing delictual liability. To borrow this construct, but for s 76 (2) of the Act 
where would liability for the acts or omissions of the pilot fall?   
Since the NPA was promulgated relatively recently one does not need to revert 
far into the annals of time to gather the legal position that went before the current 
dispensation. The NPA’s predecessor, through s 10 (1), dictated that the pilot was the 
employee of the port authority and, by extension, the state.  
Therefore, in lieu of s 76 (2) of the NPA, the pilot would have remained an 
employee of the authority. The motive behind the provision is, as is the case with the 
majority of issues pertaining to the interaction of public bodies and private interests 
in the broader context of trade, pecuniary in nature. A means, when viewed in 
conjunction with the expansion of the authority’s exemption for the acts or omissions 
of the pilot in terms of s 76 (1) and removal of the defence of compulsory pilotage, to 
definitively avoid liability, and therefore expenditure, for the negligent acts or 
omissions of pilots and to shift that liability upon ship-owning interests.  
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It is submitted that the rationale of s 10 (1) of the Legal Succession Act, 
identifying the pilot as an employee of the state, remains intact. Notwithstanding 
subsequent legislative flux, the provision accurately reflects the dynamic of the 
relationship in which port authority and pilot stand. Despite their raison d’être; to 
shift liability from the port authority to ship-owning interests, the provisions of the 
NPA governing pilotage still admit that the authority has a strong right of supervision 
and control over the pilot: 
‘[The authority must] provide or procure pilotage services, license pilots and 
regulate the safe provision of pilotage services by licensed pilots.’90 
‘The Harbour Master [an agent of the authority] is, in respect of the port for 
which he or she is appointed, the final authority in respect of all matters relating 
to pilotage’.91 
‘In the event of a disagreement between the pilot and the master of the vessel 
regarding the number of tugs to be used, the Harbour Master [an agent of the 
authority] takes the final decision’.92 
‘No person may perform the functions of a pilot in a port without having been 
duly certificated by the South African Maritime Safety Authority and licensed 
by the Authority to do so’.93 
In addition to the right of supervision and control there are other indicia, which 
point toward a relationship of employment: The services rendered by the pilot are at 
the exclusive behest and disposal of the authority. The legislature decrees that all 
South African major commercial ports are compulsory pilotage areas94 and the 
authority, as an organ of state, ensures that the decree is observed. The pilot is 
precluded from working outside this legislative framework, overseen by the 
authority. Any agreement which can be said to exist between the authority and pilot 
is an enduring one, it does not terminate upon the production of a specified result; a 
hallmark of the contract of service or employment. It is solely with the authority that 
the power to discipline the pilots rests, as an extension of its statutory duty to: 
‘regulate the safe provision of pilotage services’.95 
In sum, the Legal Succession Act and pre NPA common law accurately 
reflected the genuine relationship(s) of authority, ship-owner or master and pilot. The 
result was uniformity in both the de jure and de facto positions. Through the 
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promulgation of the NPA, that uniformity has been disturbed. The result is a vacuum, 
disparity between the de jure and de facto positions; a gulf between the import of the 
Act and the realities at hand. That is to say that the law does not accurately reflect the 
true nature of the sphere or relationship that it governs. Whilst irrational and a source 
of frustration for ship-owning interests, this schema cannot be attacked on grounds of 
legal invalidity. The state does not wish to foot the bill for damages resulting from 
incidences of pilot error. As a consequence thereof, it has through legitimate means, 
ensured that the financial burden falls elsewhere. Within this framework, the choice 
available to ship-owning interests is a simple one; comply and incur potential 
liability as a result or sail elsewhere. This rather cursory assessment evidences an 
undeniable truth; if a solution is to be found, a bridge straddling the interests of state 
and ship-owner; one must look outside the prevailing matrix.  
g) Forms of port privatisation  
Privatisation, in the context of port and ports services, takes place in two broad 
forms; comprehensive or partial. For the sake of convenience, a summary of these 
variants will follow.  
The typical rationale behind comprehensive privatisation is as follows: 
‘The public entity that has final responsibility for the port sector wants to 
privatise the entire sector, including responsibilities that generally are 
considered belonging to the public domain. Ownership of port-land, planning, 
investment and management are all transferred to private-sector entities, which 
have no formal commitments to any public institution’.96 
This form of privatisation is the exception rather than the rule.97 It requires the 
outright sale of port-land together with the transfer of all port functions, from the 
public to the private sector.98 It necessitates the enactment of new legislation, 
governing the transfer of ownership of the port-land as well as responsibility for port 
functions.99  
The primary focus of this dissertation is out of necessity restricted to the 
contemplation of the privatisation of pilotage services and, as such, the concept of 
comprehensive privatisation is beyond its scope. Rather, it is the alternate, most 
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common form of privatisation, partial privatisation that is of relevance. The 
motivation for the state to implement a program of partial privatisation is as follows:  
‘The public authority in charge of the port sector wants to restrict its public role 
by privatising cargo handling operations and other non-landlord activities. In 
this case, existing operations have to be privatised’.100 
It is apparent that partial privatisation is the product of a public-private 
partnership and, is typically coupled with the introduction of a landlord port 
authority.101 The landlord port is a product of its mixed public-private construct.102 
In accordance with this framework, the port authority acts as regulator and landlord, 
whilst port operations are conducted by private companies.103 Leasehold 
arrangements provide the port authority with a significant portion of its income. 
Typically, a lease concluded between a landlord port authority and a private 
company is consistent with the following general outline:  
‘[I]nfrastructure is leased to private operating companies or to industries such as 
refineries, tank terminals, and chemical plants. The lease to be paid to the port 
authority is usually a fixed sum per square meter per year, typically indexed to 
some measure of inflation. The level of the lease amount is related to the initial 
preparation and construction costs (for example, land reclamation and quay wall 
construction). The private port operators provide and maintain their own 
superstructure including buildings (offices, sheds, warehouses, container freight 
stations, workshops). They also purchase and install their own equipment on the 
terminal grounds as required by their businesses’.104 
Bosch-Domenech and Garcia-Montalvo provide an illustrative summary in the 
following terms: 
‘[Landlord ports] where port authorities limit their role to the building and 
owning of the infrastructure, leaving superstructure, pilotage, cargo operations 
and towage to be conducted by private operators’.105 
h) A summation of the case for privatisation 
Commenting on the results of the Napier survey106, a questionnaire targeted at 
representatives of the top 100 container ports in the world (accounting for 80 percent 
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of global container trade), Baird notes that, according to the participant port 
authorities, private-sector intervention bears the following advantages: 
‘The sharing of investment was considered by most ports (50 [percent]) to be 
the main advantage of private-sector intervention, followed by benefits gained 
through improved productivity (44 [percent]). Helping trade growth was 
mentioned by 38[percent] of ports, with management expertise mentioned by 
(31 [percent]). “Other” [specific] advantages given by ports included making 
terminals profitable, [facilitating] competition between terminals [in a port], 
improved management, and better facilitation of development’.107 
The results of the Napier survey are consistent with subsequent findings of the 
World Bank.108 The organisation’s paper identifies a number of factors as 
cornerstones of the rationale behind privatisation: 
First, the removal of trade barriers and cumbersome administrative 
procedures.109 A combination of outdated work practices and inadequate institutional 
structures result in a climate of inefficiency, posing potential obstacles to foreign 
trade.110 This is disadvantageous to both state, in an obvious sense as less trade will 
go through its ports therefore resulting in a loss in revenue, as well as private 
individuals:  
‘Indirectly, the entire population of a country pays for port inefficiencies, which 
are reflected in the prices of both import and export commodities’.111   
State-owned firms, constrained by their rigid bureaucratic construct are ill-
suited to an increasingly specialised port-industry.112 This, they submit, is 
compounded by the relatively meagre cash generation of, and lack of market 
orientation on the part of, state-owned firms. 113 
Second, the elimination of political interference. The appointment of 
inexperienced government officials, to lofty positions within government-owned 
ports, is something of an anomaly.114 The privatisation of port operations presents an 
alternate model as it generally results in the appointment of experienced individuals 
with superior expertise and an ‘undiluted focus’ on the market.115  
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Third, the reduction of the demand on the public-sector budget: 
‘Partial privatisation does not necessarily mean a total withdrawal of the 
government from port investments. However a large [often major] part of port 
investments can be undertaken by the private sector without compromising 
wider social and economic benefits. [The] development of a modern port still 
requires a balanced public-private financial package with balanced risk 
sharing’.116 
Bosch-Domenech and Garcia-Montalvo contend, in the context of port reform 
in South America, that the ultimate goal should be:  
‘To promote policies of non-discriminatory access to ports and the participation 
of the private sector in all aspects of port investment and operation. [T]he 
private sector should be encouraged to invest in port facilities and heavy port 
equipment and to share the risk and rewards of these massive investments’.117 
Haarmeyer and Yorke contend that, by their very nature, private enterprises 
boast a number of structural advantages when compared to their state-owned 
counterparts. Crucially, the link between effective-management and revenue is 
evident with regard to the former.118 They expand on this premise in the following 
terms: 
‘In all cases, the theoretical underpinning for privatisation remains the same: 
compared to publicly owned enterprises, private companies face a fuller set of 
market disciplines to operate efficiently. Publicly owned and operated 
enterprises have diffused ownership structures in the form of individual 
taxpayers or ratepayers who have little incentive to monitor performance. By 
contrast, in the private sector, ownership is generally concentrated and hence 
control and accountability are clearer’.119 
Consistent with the views espoused in the previously-cited study compiled by 
the World Bank, Haarmeyer and Yorke identify improved efficiency as a cornerstone 
of the rationale behind privatisation. The authors’ emphasis on the structural 
advantages of private enterprise is, once again, central to their thinking:  
‘[W]hether it is full or partial, privatization (sic) generates efficiency 
improvements. Because it enables an enterprise to take advantage of the 
stronger incentives associated with private ownership, reduces the potential for 
political interference, and exposes the enterprise to the full range of capital 
market disciplines and financing alternatives’.120 
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In addition, they expand on their theory that the exposure of private firms to 
competition and the impetus brought about by such exposure; is crucial to the 
success of privatisation:  
‘Studies by the World Bank and others indicate that private firms have stronger 
incentives to manage resources [more] efficiently than public enterprises 
because they are exposed to competition in the product and capital markets 
[which] can go bankrupt’.121  
i) A summation of the case against privatisation 
Conversely, participants of the Napier survey identified the following disadvantages: 
‘Most ports (31 [percent]) stated the loss of control as an issue, with 21[percent] 
mentioning political and commercial ambiguity as a problem. Difficulties in 
operator selection (15 [percent]) and the lengthy process for securing 
concessions (8 [percent]) were also highlighted. [S]ome ports mentioned other 
disadvantages such as inadequate income for the state, the possibility of an 
oligarchy developing, difficulties coordinating public and private investments, 
and the potential for unfair competition or preferential treatment’.122 
Privatisation of any number of port-services brings with it the risk of creating a 
private monopoly, replacing the public monopoly that went before it. However, the 
very nature of the role that is played by the pilot and the importance of that role 
means that the risk of a private monopoly occurring as well as the  consequences of 
such an occurrence take on a greater significance: 
‘[The privatisation of pilotage services] carries the risk of creating a private 
sector monopoly in pilotage services, especially when the pilots are privatised 
on a national or regional scale. Pilotage is an essential part of traffic 
management, and safe passage of vessels through a port area requires [the] 
expert teamwork of a vessel traffic management organisation, tugs, mooring 
gangs and pilots. A private-sector pilot monopoly that has the ability to bring 
port operations to a complete and rapid stop represents a significant risk for 
ports, carriers and shippers alike’.123 
j) The privatisation of pilotage services; case studies  
The Dutch experience 
The Netherlands pilotage service was converted into an independent organisation in 
1988, resulting in state-employed pilots morphing into private entrepreneurs.124  The 
government’s rationale behind such a move was two-fold in its construct; to reduce 
its executive and administrative burden (incurred in the course of supplying pilotage 
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services) together with the pursuit of improvement in the efficiency and adequacy of 
the services provided by pilots.125 
The framework, in terms of which, the privatisation of pilotage services in the 
Netherlands was achieved necessitated the organisation of pilots along regional and 
national lines. A synopsis follows: 
‘A public entity, the Nederlandse Loodsen Corporatie (Netherlands Pilot 
Corporation hereafter NLC) was created to manage the register of licensed 
pilots and [to] be responsible for the education and training of licensed pilots.  
In every region, the licensed pilots have set up a legal entity, the Regionale 
Loodsen Corporatie (Regional Pilot Corporation hereafter RLC). The licensed 
pilots are all shareholders of the Loodswezen Nederland BV (Pilotage Service 
of the Netherlands Ltd.), which is responsible for the exploitation of the 
independent private enterprise. All supporting staff is provided by this 
company. The company collects the pilotage fees and makes payment to the 
pilots in accordance with the financial statute. The ownership of capital goods 
used by the pilots is incorporated in the Loodswezen Materieel BV (Pilotage 
Services Materials Ltd.). Individual pilots, united in regional partnerships 
[known as pilot associations] render the pilotage services. Supporting services 
are provided by the Loodswezen Nederland BV. Five foundations are 
responsible for education, social allowances, management of pension funds, and 
allowances for special situations’.126 
All registered pilots are members of the NLC.127 In addition to responsibility 
for the training of pilots, the NLC is tasked with ensuring that pilotage services are 
conducted in a satisfactory manner.128 The NLC is comprised of three bodies: the 
president, board and general assembly.129 The four regional presidents and president 
of the NLC sit on the board. It is with the board, as a component of the NLC, that 
responsibility for training and professional standards rests.130 The general assembly 
provides the framework within which the board operates; it drafts rules, formally 
known as decrees.131 The primary purpose of the general assembly’s decrees is to 
ensure and maintain a high standard of pilotage services.132 Existing decrees cover 
the following spheres inter alia:  
‘[P]rofessional conduct, service provision, finances, [training schemes] for 
aspiring pilots and inclusion in the pilot registry’.133  
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Furthermore, the general assembly plays a crucial advisory role in matters 
related to the Dutch Pilotage Act, a specialised piece of legislation, crystallizing the 
state’s role in the public-private partnership. 134 
In so far as the regional organization of Dutch pilots is concerned, the 
Netherlands is divided into four regions: Noord (North), Amsterdam-IJmond, 
Rotterdam-Rijnmond and Scheldemonden.135 Each region has its own RLC. The 
RLCs’ structure is near identical to that of the NLC; they too are comprised of a 
board, president and general assembly. The respective boards (of the RLCs) are 
tasked with the intake of aspirant pilots, ensuring that the required numbers of 
registered pilots are available.136 
The impact of the privatisation of pilotage services in the Netherlands has been 
generally positive. There is an admission from the government that its primary 
objectives have been met; it has successfully ridded itself of its prior executive 
burden. Also, the increased amount of pilot activity, viewed in conjunction with the 
reduced number of licensed pilots, is indicative of an improvement in pilot 
efficiency.137  However, there is a concern that privatisation has brought with it the 
monopolisation of pilotage services. In addition, the cost-structure of the pilotage 
organisation has attracted criticism as it is not transparent. The pilots’ fees are non-
negotiable and steep,  this, detractors have argued, has had a negative knock-on 
effect on other port-service providers as they have come under pressure to reduce 
their fees as a result.138  
The Mozambican experience; Maputo 
The partial privatisation of the Mozambican port of Maputo has resulted in 
something of a renaissance. A consortium by the name of Maputo Port Development 
Company (MPDC), which consortium is chiefly financed by the Mersey Docks and 
Harbour Company together with the Standard Corporate and Merchant Bank, is now 
responsible for the operation of all port activities; including inter alia the provision 
of pilotage services.139 Port regulation has however remained under government 
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control, following the archetypal construct of the public-private model.140 In the 
African context, it is novel. 141 
MPDC’s mandate was and remains a multi-faceted one, secured by the 
granting of a 25 year concession in April 2003, with the overriding theme being one 
of economic recovery.142 The Mozambican government identified private 
involvement as a vehicle for necessary reform:  
‘[I]mproving not only the port’s status as a cargo and passenger port, but also to 
lead its port services and operational improvement strategy [my emphasis]’.143  
It is however worth noting that the port of Maputo was ravaged by years of 
civil war and neglect, consequently it was in a state of severe disrepair at the 
commencement of MPDC’s mandate.144 Such an observation, it is conceded, is 
undeniably pertinent when considering the results of the public-private interaction 
that has taken place.  
MPDC has launched a 70 million (U.S dollar) priority works programme 
focusing on the improvement of port infrastructure and services.145 Continuous, 
reliable port operations have been introduced and new training schemes 
implemented.146 Albeit with the above-mentioned caveat, progress has been 
achieved, resulting in a steady increase of trade:  
‘The concession has  increased efficiency and handling volumes at the Maputo 
Harbour from 4.3 million tonnes in 2002 to 5.54 million tonnes in 2004’.147 
 
‘In January 2002, sea freight throughput in the Port of Maputo had dropped to 
1.2 million tonnes per annum, but as a result of new investment and increased 
interest in the port, 6.2 million tonnes was achieved in July 2005’.148 
 
It is trite that the above-cited figures cannot be attributed to the privatisation of 
pilotage services alone. However, the case of Maputo does provide proof of concept 
for a broader proposition. That private-sector investment and the consequent 
adoption of private commercial principles can have a dramatic effect in a relatively 
short space of time:  
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‘With more recent investment in the Port of Maputo, industries such as 
automotive imports, fresh produce exports, and bulk mineral exports have 
increased Maputo’s competiveness with the Port of Richards Bay, which falls 
under the control of Transnet Port Terminals. Faced with challenges, a 
previously under-developed port has now provided an alternate nodal point for 
ships wishing to access South[ern] Africa at a competitive price, providing 
handling services comparable with South African ports, as well as with 
significantly less port delays and no port congestion’. 149 
Lessons taken from the comprehensive privatisation of British ports 
Whilst the subject of comprehensive port privatisation necessitates a debate that 
exceeds the scope of this dissertation, it is submitted that there is some value to be 
extracted from the British experience, and in particular Baird’s critique thereof; in 
the course of considering the partial privatisation of South Africa’s ports.  
The United Kingdom is one of the few nations to have implemented the 
comprehensive privatisation of a number of its ports.150 Through offering shares in 
February 1983, the U.K privatised nineteen of the nation’s state-owned ports.151 
Britain’s lengthy exposure to and subsequent experience of commercial port 
privatisation provides a useful point of reference.152  
The primary means of comprehensive privatisation in Britain was the Ports 
Act.153 A glimpse into its schema provides an illustrative example of the manner in 
which comprehensive privatisation was achieved:  
‘This law provides for the formation of harbour authorities [as] limited 
companies under the Companies Act, and for the subsequent sale of their 
shares. All property, rights, liabilities and statutory functions are transferred to 
the new port-companies. Ministerial approval is required for the sale of shares 
and the subsequent dissolution of the harbour authority. The company has to 
pay the government fifty percent of the proceeds of the sale of shares, less any 
amount set aside for assistance to maximise employee participation. If the 
company later sells port-land, a twenty five percent levy is charged on the 
proceeds of the sale during the first five years, twenty percent for the next two 
years and ten percent for the years eight through till ten’.154 
Haarmeyer and Yorke submit that the rationale behind privatisation in the 
United Kingdom was three-fold in its construct: 
‘One, before 1980, most port services were controlled by public harbour boards 
and trusts that restricted competition and increased the cost of port services. 
Two, to remain competitive with European ports and other British cargo 
transport systems, ports had to be able to quickly adapt to market conditions and 
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implement new technology such as containerization. [Three], under the control 
of public harbour boards or trusts, the business that ports could enter was 
restricted. This meant that not only could publicly controlled ports not diversify 
into more profitable commercial ventures but that the real-estate assets owned 
by the British ports could not be transferred to more economically valuable 
uses’.155 
Can the British privatisation experience be regarded as a success? Albeit 
writing in 1993 the answer provided by Haarmeyer and Yorke is categorically in the 
affirmative. The authors identify a number of beneficial economic impacts brought 
about by the privatisation of the nations’ ports: 
First, ‘a more co-operative and productive workplace’.156 This, they contend, 
was brought about by an increase in labour productivity, borne out by the downsizing 
of the labour force and increase in cargo tonnage handled.157 
Second, ‘privatisation eliminated the restrictions on diversification imposed by 
the 1962 Transport Act and hence provided opportunities for profitable investment 
outside core port functions’.158 
Third, ‘by accessing private capital markets and facilitating the disposal of 
assets, privatisation made more resources available for capital investment’.159 
The second and third benefits identified by Haarmeyer and Yorke are 
inextricably linked. The authors point to a rise in the Associated British Ports’ share 
price, from an original offer price of 112 pence in 1983 to 386 pence in 1993, as 
proof of increased investment and profitability.160 
As to the market value of the shares, Haarmeyer and Yorke note that:  
‘market capitalization went from 44.5 million pounds in 1983, to over 720 million pounds 
ten years later – an over sixteen fold increase in value’.161 
In addition, the authors identify a number of further, specific spin-off effects: 
The expansion of ports and upgrading of port facilities, allowing for an 
increase in port capacity.162 
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‘Port asset diversification through property development’.163 Housing 
developments, leisure parks, hotels and shopping malls, developed on port land, 
boosting and widening revenue streams.164 
Has this undoubtedly positive conclusion been dimmed by the cumulative 
weight of time and experience? Baird, writing some seven years later,165 contends so.  
Baird argues that ports were sold, by the public sector to the private sector, at 
prices that failed to take their true market value into account. Ports, the author 
submits, were sold at an incredibly low price: 
‘Subsequent trading in port shares in the post-privatisation period suggested that 
almost all UK ports were sold at prices approximating between only 5% and 
25% of their “real” market value. There are a number of noteworthy examples: 
Medway ports, sold to an MEBO166 in 1992 for a levy of 13.2 million pounds, 
was acquired by Mersey Docks & Harbour Company in 1993 for 104 million 
pounds; Clydeport was sold to an MEBO in 1992 for 11.6 million, and 
subsequently floated on the stock market three years later with a market 
capitalisation approaching 60 million pounds”. 167 
This disparity in market value and sale price can be attributed, according to 
Baird, to the fact that:  
‘Port valuations relied on advisor’s assumptions and perceptions of the market 
for ports at the time of privatisation, a market that until then had not existed, 
therefore rendering valuations judgmental’.168 
In addition to criticising the lack of foresight on the part of British government 
with regard to the valuation of ports, the most salient point to be taken from Baird’s 
critique is his questioning of the suitability and indeed viability of comprehensive 
privatisation as a concept:  
‘As UK ports were sold at significantly discounted prices, relatively little 
money was actually raised from their sale. This begged the question why there 
was a need to dispose of ports in this way as opposed to using alternative 
methods of privatisation (e.g. port and terminal concessions), which could have 
raised significantly greater revenues for the public sector over the longer term 
and generated private sector investment in new port facilities [my 
emphasis]’.169 
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Baird argues that the comprehensive privatisation of British ports merely 
replaced a public monopoly with a private one, with the entire port capacity of the 
majority of ports being sold to a single successor company.170 As such, he posits that 
the position of consumers, those that make use of ports and ports services in order to 
further their respective interests, have remained largely unaffected. 171 
Baird’s disapproval extends beyond the means of privatisation employed to the 
manner in which it was executed. He contends that: 
‘Some ports were crying out for investment and redevelopment, but that was not 
what the UK privatisation experiment was about. Privatisation led to an 
injection of cash, but only in terms of purchasing existing assets. There were no 
formalised commitments [my emphasis] made by buyers to significantly 
modernise and invest in replacement port facilities to improve the economy, this 
being a fundamental objective of privatisation in other countries’. 172 
In attempting to reconcile the views of Haarmeyer and Yorke with those of 
Baird it is apparent that there is some disparity between that which the 
comprehensive privatisation of Britain’s ports promised to achieve and that which 
actually transpired. It is however crucial to acknowledge that Baird does not dismiss 
the concept of privatisation entirely:  
‘This paper in no way seeks to criticise the concept of port privatisation, far 
from it. When carried out properly, and for the right reasons, port privatisation 
offers port users and the economy as a whole many benefits. However, when 
port privatisation schemes are badly designed, inadequate, and implemented for 
the wrong reasons, then port users (and the economy) are unlikely to receive 
any benefits’.173 
Pertinently, in dismissing comprehensive privatisation, Baird espouses that a 
public –private partnership should be the bedrock upon which a successful 
privatisation venture is built: 
‘Most forms of privatisation, with the exception of the outright sale method 
adopted in the UK, have the potential to bring about positive outcomes with 
respect to port investment, port competition, port planning and control, and port 
organisation. The outright sale method and subsequent withdrawal of the state 
from its ports industry does not appear to generate any of these benefits [my 
emphasis]’. 174 
‘[P]rivate sector investment in ports should not be regarded as a complete 
substitute for public sector investment. Public sector support, particularly in 
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regard to provision of certain elements of new port infrastructure [my 
emphasis], is still likely to be necessary to a greater or lesser extent’.175 
‘There appears to be no good reason for a country to withdraw entirely from its 
ports industry, as the UK has done. This is reflected in the reality of 
international port investment today, with by far the majority of port 
privatisation initiatives still involving some form of public sector 
investment’.176 
k) Privatisation of pilotage services in South Africa; the practicalities 
How does the privatisation of pilotage services, as a specific form of partial 
privatisation, take place?  Pilots constitute a select group of professionals upon 
whom the successful management of vessels is heavily reliant.177 Keenly aware of 
their importance, pilots are often the first group, within the context of those 
performing port services, to demand privatisation.178  
A report on the subject, compiled by the World Bank identifies two scenarios:  
‘There are two ways of privatising the pilotage function. Pilots can be self-
employed and work under the oversight of a maritime authority that serves as 
the regulator and licensor of the individual pilots, or pilots can organize 
themselves into a private company’.179 
It is somewhat trite that there is little merit or use in seeking to hold an 
individual pilot liable for the consequences of his / her negligence. The quantum of 
claims resulting from pilot error is typically vast and, by comparison, the resources 
available to a pilot as an individual are slim. This point is made by Yuen:  
‘The imposition of liability on the pilot, even to the point of bankruptcy, is 
unlikely to have any significant impact on the payment for the damage suffered 
by various parties’.180 
However, it is contended that the above-cited maxim does not apply to 
commercial entities providing pilotage services for financial gain.181  
It is submitted that the Dutch model of privatisation, specifically the 
organisation of pilots on both a national and regional scale, presents a viable 
blueprint for the privatisation of pilotage services in South Africa.  The application 
of the Dutch model and adoption of the principles espoused therein would provide 
the structure for a new framework of liability, transferring liability from the ship-
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owner to a National Pilots’ Corporation (NPC). The proposed schema would be 
predicated on the NPC obtaining insurance cover, on behalf of its members, for the 
purpose of satisfying claims stemming from pilot error. The cost of insurance 
would be satisfied through one of the following sources: 
An annual levy raised by the NPC, an equivalent of the Dutch Nederlandse 
Loodsen Corporatie, of which all registered pilots must be a part, to be paid by its 
members; as a pre-requisite of their membership.  
Deduction from the pooled income derived from pilotage fees, held in trust 
by an equivalent of the Loodswezen Nederland BV. 182 
It is submitted that this shift is consistent with the fundamental principles of 
the doctrine of vicarious liability. This is apparent upon an analysis of the 
relationship in which pilot and the proposed NPC would stand; employing the dual 
prism of South African labour law and the contemporary notion of vicarious 
liability encapsulated in the work of Morgan.  
Whilst it has been previously argued that the factual relationship in which 
ship-owner or master and pilot stand is not consistent with that which is required in 
South African law for vicarious liability to result,183 that is to say a relationship 
akin to employment, it is submitted that the proposed relationship between NPC 
and pilot would not suffer the same fate. This is primarily so as the dominant 
impression obtained after dissecting the latter differs from that which is obtained 
after analysing the former.  
The extent of control that the proposed NPC would exert over its member 
pilots differs markedly to the extremely limited amount of control that a ship-owner 
or master is able to exert over a pilot under the current dispensation.  
Whilst it is conceded that the NPC would not exercise direct control over the 
day to day activities of the pilot, it would control entry into the pilotage profession. 
In accordance with the decrees drafted by its general assembly, the board would 
dictate the requirements with which aspirant pilots would have to comply and 
thereafter the standard to which its member pilots would have to adhere to; in the 
course of providing pilotage services. In this sense, the association would exert a 
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considerable amount of control over the behaviour of its pilots through dictating the 
manner in which its pilots would have to act. Fundamentally, it is submitted that the 
extent of control the NPC would wield is consistent with the definition of an 
employer’s right of control in Smit.184 
The NPC would have a clear right of supervision, evaluating the conduct of 
its member pilots against the standard set by its board; supplemented by continuous 
training and evaluation programs. This, it is contended, is consistent with the 
definition of an employer’s right of supervision in Smit.  
In addition, it is submitted that the following factors are relevant to the 
dynamic of the relationship in which the NPC and pilot would stand and are further 
indicia that said relationship is akin to one of employment:  
The pilot would render his/ her services exclusively to the association.  
In accordance with its decrees, the NPC would have the authority and power 
to discipline its member pilots.  
Through its financial services affiliated company, of which all licensed pilots 
would be shareholders (an equivalent of the Loodswezen Nederland BV), the 
association would collect pilotage fees and distribute them to the pilots in 
accordance with its financial statute. In sum, the association would pay the pilots’ 
wages.  
By way of summation, after having recourse to the above, it is submitted that 
the dominant impression obtained is that the pilot is an employee of the NPC.  
Employing the yardstick provided by South African labour law, it can be said that 
the NPC and pilot would stand in a relationship akin to employment.  
It should further be noted that the proposed relationship of NPC and pilot 
would, in contrast to the relationship of ship-owner or master and pilot, trigger the 
rebuttable presumption of employment contained in s 200 A of the Labour 
Relations Act. This is so inter alia as the manner in which the pilot works would be 
subject to the control or direction of the NPC. The pilot would be a member of the 
NPC and therefore form part of the pilot association. The pilot would render his / 
her services exclusively to the association.  
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The recalibration of liability in the proposed form is similarly consistent with 
the modern notion of vicarious liability. In accordance with the deterrence theory, 
the body with the ability to best guard against harm occurring, the NPC, would be 
accountable should harm transpire.  
This pairing of the ability to guard against the occurrence of harm with 
accountability provides a positive spin-off effect. The resultant synergy provides 
the pilot with a clear vested interest in ensuring that pilotage services are conducted 
in a safe manner. This is undoubtedly so, as the standard of the services supplied 
will have a bearing on the premium charged by the pilots’ underwriters. It is trite 
that ensuring that pilotage services are conducted in a safe manner stands to benefit 
a vast array of groups and stake-holders including port-users, government and the 
citizenry as a whole. The pilot incurs a similar impetus in so far as efficiency is 
concerned. It is he / she that stands to benefit through improved efficiency in the 
form of increased revenue and ultimately income. This is borne out by the Dutch 
experience, which resulted in a dramatic increase in productivity. In simple terms, 
‘less pilots carrying out more activities’. 185This streamlining of the pilotage 
enterprise resulted in a significant increase in income for the privatised Dutch 
pilots.186 Those pilots that buy into the South African privatisation model would 
stand to gain similarly. As per the observation of Haarmeyer and Yorke,187 the 
meshing of risk and reward in this sense is a key component of private ownership in 
the commercial realm and yields potentially massive benefits for stakeholders.  
The proposed re-calibration is similarly consistent with another underpinning 
principle of vicarious liability; the concept of enterprise liability. As Morgan 
succinctly states:  
‘Enterprise liability justifications are based on the idea that with benefits comes 
burdens, he who takes the profit of the enterprise should take the loss’. 188  
Pilots, as individuals, benefit from the services that they provide in an 
obvious and very tangible sense through their share of the fees generated. It is 
therefore logical that the burden of liability is shouldered by the pilots as a 
collective.  
                                                          
185‘From State Pilot to members of Private Pilot Associations, Backgrounds 1859-2000’ at 3, available 
at http://www.loodswezen.nl accessed on 03 August 2014.  
186Ibid. 
187D Haarmeyer and P Yorke ‘Port Privatization’ at 5.  
188Morgan 2012 Cambridge Law Journal 618.  
39 
 
Such a premise admittedly provides scope for an argument that the state 
should subsidise the activities of the pilots’ operation; as it too stands to benefit 
from the positive spin-off effects generated by an improved pilotage service.  It is 
however submitted that, for the purposes of this piece, a discussion of the merits of 
a potential state subsidy are premature.  
Ultimately, it should be noted that Morgan distances himself from an over-
formulaic analysis of the doctrine of vicarious liability, instead favouring a broad 
approach.189 Indeed, the archetypal question posed by Morgan is relatively simple 
in its construct; for whose team does the individual in question play?  It is 
submitted that this rhetoric is underpinned by the presence of a voluntary linkage 
between team and individual, the entity held liable (A) and tortfeasor (B). As has 
been argued at some length,190 the writer contends that such a voluntary linkage is 
indeed a prerequisite for vicarious liability to result. Whilst it is absent in the 
relationship of ship-owner or master and pilot, it would undeniably be present in 
the relationship of NPC and pilot. Aspirant pilots would make an application for 
association membership and the NPC would either approve or decline such an 
application.  
To revert to the seminal question posed by Morgan, in the system of 
privatisation proposed the pilot is, in essence, playing for him or herself. However, 
for the reasons advanced, he or she cannot be held accountable as an individual. 
Yet, whilst it may be the accepted norm in a number of jurisdictions, such an 
eventuality does not provide a sound rationale for imposing liability on the ship-
owner. Rather, as provided for by the national organisation of pilots, accountability 
can be shared by the collective. In so doing, this recognises the pilot for what 
he/she truly is; a highly specialised professional.  
That the pilot would operate under the supervision and control of the NPC 
provides a sound rationale in law for shifting liability in the manner proposed.  It is 
a compromise borne of pragmatism. Through its consistency with both the 
traditional and contemporary notions of vicarious liability it removes the need to 
create a legal fiction, irrationally and inaccurately naming the pilot as an employee 
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of the ship-owner. The result is the removal of the disjuncture of the previous 
dispensation and a consequent uniformity in the de jure and de facto positions.  
It is not just the pilot that stands to gain from the privatisation of pilotage 
services as proposed and the resultant adoption of a modus operandi that is in line 
with the principles of commercial enterprise.   
The authority would be released from a substantial administrative and 
financial burden and the port-user would be subjected to an altogether more 
accessible, transparent and predictable process.  
It is submitted that the rights of third party victims, suffering harm as result of 
incidences of pilot error, would be strengthened through the privatisation of 
pilotage services as proposed; and the consequent transfer of liability from the ship-
owner to the NPC. Third-parties would no longer be at the mercy of the 
conscientiousness of ship-owners. The compensation obtainable by third-parties 
would no longer be potentially reduced to the value of the offending res. In 
addition, claimants would be relieved from the undertaking of establishing the 
ownership of a particular vessel; an incredibly onerous and potentially far from 
straight-forward task. Crucially, this shift would be in keeping with one of the key 
tenets of the doctrine of vicarious liability; to safeguard the claims of innocent 
third-parties.  
In transferring risk from the ship-owner to the pilot association, the benefit 
obtained by ship-owning interests is obvious. However, it is submitted, that such a 
move also has the potential to generate benefits which are less obvious in nature. It 
is contended that a reduction in the risk of the ship-owner, when viewed in 
conjunction with a more efficient pilotage service, constitutes a very real incentive 
for ship-owning interests to use South Africa’s ports; expanding trade and revenue 
streams in the process. This point is made by Baird:  
‘Seaports are necessary to enable regions and nations to trade. But in today’s 
global environment, seaports must be able to offer levels of efficiency and costs 
that are comparable with other ports. Ports at variance in a negative sense from 
what might be regarded as the industry ‘norms’ in term of costs and efficiencies 
will obviously be disadvantaged relative to other ports. In turn, this will render a 
region’s or nation’s industrial output at a competitive disadvantage to other 
regions and nations which enjoy access to more cost effective and advanced 
seaports’.191 
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It is necessary to stress that the partial privatisation of South Africa’s ports – 
specifically the privatisation of pilotage services – is a viable means of 
compromise. It is somewhat trite that the state has a legitimate interest in ensuring 
that pilotage services are conducted in a safe and efficient manner. Through a 
specialised Pilotage Act, the state would be able to maintain a necessary degree of 
control. Privatisation along the lines proposed would not rob the state of its 
supervisory and regulatory capacity. Far from it, the absence of competition in the 
schema’s tentative, preliminary stages requires a strong state presence to militate 
against market abuse.  
It is contended then that the port authority should retain a degree of 
responsibility and subsequent control over the services delivered by pilots. The 
authority has a crucial role to play in providing oversight and regulation in a number 
of spheres including inter alia: 
‘Training requirements and pilot qualifications, standards for obtaining a 
certificate or license and its revocation, operation of a vessel traffic 
management system, communication equipment and channels, investigation of 
incidents and follow-up actions, pilotage tariffs and financial record keeping, 
medical fitness and continued proficiency, reporting requirements to the 
relevant port authority’. 192 
This is consistent with the results of the Napier survey,193 the results of which 
provide a synopsis of the public port authority’s role in the following terms:  
‘The role of a public port authority is considered to include creating basic 
infrastructure (63[percent]), regulation and safety (46[percent]), ensuring fair 
competition and pricing (42[percent]), and the public good (40[percent])’. 194 
 Crucially, the involvement of the state through the port authority, in the above-
mentioned spheres, and the resultant private-public partnership would guard against a 
loss of control; the primary concern raised by those opposed to privatisation.195  
The framework for this dynamic is provided by the partnership that lies at the 
root of the relationship between public and private interests. Baird identifies the 
schema set out above as the ‘PRIVATE/I model’ and is instructive in this regard:  
‘Countries adopting the PRIVATE/I model tend to stress the need for efficient 
and advanced ports to help expand trade, to allow the state to withdraw from 
port operations, and to reduce pressure on the public sector budget from port 
expenditure. Experience of the PRIVATE/I model suggests it is possible for the 
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state to leverage private sector investment in its ports without losing control of 
its ports industry or ultimate property rights in respect of port land’.196  
l) Obstacles to the privatisation of pilotage services in South Africa  
It is trite that the most effective driver of reform is political will. However, in the 
South African context, it is difficult to envisage the necessary driving force 
required from government to facilitate the privatisation of pilotage services in the 
immediate future. South Africa has shown a general resistance toward privatisation 
as a concept.197 The reason, or indeed reasons, for which are not entirely clear:  
‘Few of South Africa’s, and even Africa’s, core SOCs, which dominate 
economies have been privatised or even partially divested. This may be partly 
because certain existing ideological and political environments prefer state 
control over that of free markets, and privatisation on a broader scale in South 
Africa seems highly unlikely over the next few years’.198 
An institutional hesitancy to support a proposal for the privatisation of pilotage 
services presents a very real and potentially insurmountable hurdle. This is 
particularly so as the best evidence shows that a solid and clearly defined public-
private partnership is necessary for a scheme of privatisation to succeed. Simply put, 
both public and private interests must buy into the idea. Government co-operation 
and indeed support is a pre-requisite:  
‘Privatisation works best when governments simultaneously adopt an effective 
regulatory regime, and promote competition and new entry into a deregulated 
market’.199 
If the government is to come to the table it must ultimately be convinced, 
‘[that] the efficiency gain [is] larger than the societal loss’.200 That is to say that it 
must be satisfied that any short-term loss, be it in the loss of public-sector jobs or 
revenue, will be sufficiently offset by the positive long-term effects of privatisation; 
a streamlined pilotage service reducing public expenditure and facilitating an 
expansion in trade. The prospects of such an exercise are predicated upon the 
possession of a long-term view on the part of decision makers and – given the 
aforementioned climate of hesitancy – may prove to be no mean feat.  
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It is submitted that the pilots themselves, spurred on by the prospects of greater 
profit margins, present the most likely source of impetus for the privatisation of 
pilotage services.  
Such is the breadth of the debate surrounding privatisation in the context of 
port services and ownership that it is somewhat problematic to view the privatisation 
of pilotage services and analyse the potential impact thereof in isolation. Whilst such 
discourse is beyond the scope of this piece, it is submitted that if the privatisation of 
pilotage services in South Africa were to take place it is likely and indeed logical that 
it would transpire as a product of a broader discussion ; a public-private partnership 
resulting in the privatisation of the majority if not all port operations.  
m) Conclusion 
After having recourse to South African labour jurisprudence, it is submitted that the 
creation of a servant-master relationship, between pilot and ship-owner or master, 
through section 76 (2) of the NPA does not accurately reflect the de facto 
relationship in which the parties stand. 
After having recourse to the governing law, respective positions occupied by 
ship-owner and port-authority, broad-based considerations of policy and key tenets 
of the rationale behind the doctrine of vicarious liability; it is submitted that the 
provision’s importation of the doctrine of vicarious liability and consequent foisting 
of liability on the ship-owner is illogical, unjust and impractical.  
It is submitted that the privatisation of pilotage services in South Africa 
presents a solution alternate to the irrational imposition of the doctrine of liability; 
negating the need for the dynamic of the relationship of ship-owner or master and 
pilot to be dramatically altered by way of statute. 
It is submitted that the re-organisation of pilots, as proposed, presents a viable 
framework for the shifting of liability, from ship-owning interests to pilot 
association, in a manner consistent with South African labour law together with the 
traditional and contemporary interpretations of the doctrine of vicarious liability. 
It is submitted, as a result of its potential to yield a number of multi-faceted 
benefits, that the privatisation of pilotage services as proposed provides a solution 
palatable to government, ship-owning interests and pilot.  
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It is further and finally submitted that partial privatisation is preferable to 
comprehensive privatisation. Whilst conceding that the privatisation of pilotage 
services should ideally take place as a key element in a broader movement of the 
partial privatisation of South Africa’s ports, an initial privatisation of pilotage 
services could provide both a driving force and working yardstick for the further 
privatisation of port services. And, in so doing, provide the foundation for South 
Africa to reap a number of wider, long-term benefits stemming from the partial 
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